None algorithm
Unsigned synthetic token: HTTP 200 on vulnerable, 401 on repaired.
Open labJWT browser and request evidence
These paired cases demonstrate browser-storage discovery and exact Authorization, cookie, form and nested-JSON request carriers. The separate nested-JSON exploit case shows why a weak signing key matters. All tokens are synthetic.
JWT attack labs
PTK's JWT documentation names these five families. A working target is not a confirmed PTK finding; the mode and evidence for each case must be checked separately.
Unsigned synthetic token: HTTP 200 on vulnerable, 401 on repaired.
Open labPublic RSA bytes used as an HMAC key grant synthetic admin only on the vulnerable route.
Open labA forged nested-JSON JWT succeeds with the weak key, not the repaired strong key.
Open labDistinct from alg:none: HS256 with an empty signature succeeds only on the vulnerable route.
The vulnerable verifier trusts a bounded embedded public JWK; the repaired route pins its own key.
Open labStatic hosting
Open the review page, then open the PTK JWT tool. Compare it with the clean control on the same origin.
Seeds synthetic JWTs in a readable cookie, localStorage and sessionStorage.
Open storage reviewRuns the same storage workflow with non-JWT values and clears review tokens first.
Open storage controlLocal runtime
Generate one bounded request at a time using Authorization, an HttpOnly cookie, a form field or a nested JSON property.
Each vulnerable endpoint has a paired control with the same method, token and browser action.
Open local DAST casesIssue a user token, inspect and re-sign it, then compare admin authorization with the strong-key control.
Open nested JSON caseThe same open fixtures also model algorithm-none, empty-signature, key-path and remote-key metadata handling without exposing private scanner rules.
Review advanced cases